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Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to provide a first sketch of an analytical framework 
which could be used for the comparative analysis of welfare state develop-
ments, under the form of emergence, consolidation, expansion and reform. 
We shall do so inspired by Flora and Heidenheimer’s (1981) seminal work 
on the development of the welfare state, and more specifically we shall de-
part from the ‘sequencing’ which is provided at the end of the book in the 
contribution by Hugh Heclo (“Towards a New Welfare State?”) which dif-
ferentiates the ‘stages of welfarism’ in four phases: experimentation, consol-
idation, expansion, reformulation based on the analysis of political and eco-
nomic events (Heclo, 1981: 386-387). Furthermore, we will also use Flora’s 
‘macro-constellation’ of factors in proposing an analytical framework which 
will be used also for comparative purposes. The article is organised as fol-
lows: section 2 traces the main similarities and differences with respect to 
welfare state developments in Western Europe and Latin America; section 3 
critically discusses the most relevant theories of welfare state developments 
used for the analysis of welfare state developments in the two continents; 
section 4 discusses the results of our review and presents the analytical 
framework which should allow us to better understand – from a theoretical 
perspective – the evolution of welfare states in the two continents under scru-
tiny, and beyond. 
Keywords: Welfare state theories; Welfarism; ‘macro-constellation’;  
Europe; Latin America   
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1. Introduction 
Welfare state analysis is several decades old and has gone through significant 
phases of research (Myles and Quadagno, 2002). The main focus of both 
theoretical and empirical research has primarily been Western Europe, to-
gether with the United States, New Zealand and Australia. As Myles and 
Quadagno recall: “From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s welfare state re-
search concentrated on the long slow growth of the social programs associ-
ated with Bismarck’s Germany in the 1880s to the postwar boom in welfare 
state expansion (the period of high industrialism) that came to maturity (and 
to an end) in the mid-1970s” (Myles and Quadagno, 2002: 35). Put differ-
ently, ‘classic studies’ in terms of both the analysis of the emergence and the 
consolidation of welfare state ‘regimes’ have been centred on a limited set 
of countries. Both historical accounts (among others, Begg, 1961; Baldwin, 
1990) and sociological or political science accounts (among many others, 
Wilensky, 1975; Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1990) have been focusing 
on economically ‘advanced’ countries, limiting the geographical scope of 
their analysis. Only over the past decade a growing interest towards other 
regions of the world has developed, primarily Asia and Latin America 
(Gough and Wood, 2004; Carnes and Mares, 2007; Castles, Leibfried, Lewis, 
Obinger and Pierson, 2010; Kennett, 2013). The widening of the empirical 
cases constitutes a great opportunity for broader welfare state theorisation, 
and so far – at least to our knowledge – only limited attention has been paid 
to the determinants of welfare state emergence, consolidation and reform in 
such a comparative fashion, i.e. including both ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
countries. Gough, for example, has been working with continuity on the anal-
ysis of ‘social policy regimes in the developing world’, but has not been pri-
marily interested in understanding the ‘politics of welfare state’ in a compar-
ative perspective. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a first sketch of an analytical framework 
which could be used for the comparative analysis of welfare state develop-
ments, under the form of emergence, consolidation, expansion and reform. 
We shall do so inspired by Flora and Heidenheimer’s (1981) seminal work 
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on the development of the welfare state, and more specifically we shall de-
part from the ‘sequencing’ which is provided at the end of the book in the 
contribution by Hugh Heclo (“Towards a New Welfare State?”) which dif-
ferentiates the ‘stages of welfarism’ in four phases: experimentation, consoli-
dation, expansion, reformulation based on the analysis of political and eco-
nomic events (Heclo, 1981: 386-387). Furthermore, we will also use Flora’s 
‘macro-constellation’ of factors in proposing an analytical framework which 
will be used also for comparative purposes. More specifically, according to 
Flora (1981), a ‘macro-constellation’ of factors has favored the introduction of 
social protection schemes and their subsequent expansion. The emergence of 
the welfare state was actually linked with peculiar conditions in i) the interna-
tional system, ii) the nation-state, iii) mass democracy, iv) family-population, 
v) industrial society, vi) capitalism.  
The article is organised as follows: section 2 traces the main similarities and 
differences with respect to welfare state developments in Western Europe 
and Latin America; section 3 critically discusses the most relevant theories 
of welfare state developments used for the analysis of welfare state develop-
ments in the two continents; section 4 discusses the results of our review and 
presents the analytical framework which should allow us to better understand 
– from a theoretical perspective – the evolution of welfare states in the two 
continents under scrutiny and beyond.  
2. Welfare state development in Latin America and Europe: a se-
quenced process  
2.1. The European trajectory 
Before reviewing existing theories of welfare state change, we need to verify 
if and how the sequencing of welfare state trajectories in Europe and in La-
tina America can be compared. For this purpose, it is necessary to briefly 
outline the main stages and features of social protection development in both 
areas of the world. In a nutshell, a sequenced process may in fact be observed 
with four main phases in both regions.  
In Europe, as recalled by Briggs (1961: 250), after the early start in Germany 
(1882, 1884 and 1889) – which was soon followed by Denmark (1891-1898) 
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and Belgium (1894-1903) –  social protection was diffused throughout the 
continent during a period which can be labeled as the ‘emergence’ of the 
welfare state. This period stretches from the last two decades of the 19th cen-
tury until the first two decades of the 20th century. By the 1920s, all Nordic, 
Anglo-Saxon, Central and South European countries had established at least 
one public social protection schemes and completed the emergence (Heclo 
would call it ‘experimentalis[t]’ – Heclo, 1981: 386) phase of welfare state 
development. In Briggs’ words: “By the end of the nineteenth and the begin-
ning of the twentieth century there had been a general reaction against at-
tempts to maintain self-regulating systems of markets. This reaction has been 
variously described as ‘the decline of liberalism’, ‘the advent of collectivism’ 
and ‘the rise of socialism’” (Briggs, 1961: 229-230). From a policy perspec-
tive, it was a phase characterised by state solutions – especially in health 
care, pensions and social assistance fields – built following ‘collectivised’ 
social protection concerns which were institutionally taken into full consid-
eration for the first time in history. Put differently, the state took over the 
market and the family (and charities).   
The first social protection schemes were built in accordance to different prin-
ciples, namely social insurance and social assistance – apart from the Swe-
dish universalistic pensions system, already inspired by the social security 
principle1. Following the ‘original choice’ (Ferrera 1993) of protecting either 
workers or those most in need, two models emerged: Bismarckian systems 
and Beveridge (ante litteram) systems. There is no need to go into the details 
of the differences, which are well-known among welfare state scholars, but 
it is already during such early years that differences among ‘models’ of wel-
fare states started to emerge. For our purposes, this is not particularly rele-
vant since our main interest in this article is to unveil the shared patterns of 
welfare state developments (in terms of emergence, consolidation, expansion 
and reform/retrenchment) and not to focus on the intraregional differences 
which have been central in the analysis of other welfare state scholars – start-
ing with Wilensky (1975), followed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and many 
                                                 
1 Following Ferrera (1993) we distinguish among the various social protection principles: so-
cial insurance, social assistance and social security. 
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others. In other terms, beyond country-specific content differences and insti-
tutional diversities which were rooted in the initial trajectories of European 
welfare states (Baldwin, 2005), during the ‘emergence’ phase both the Bis-
marckian and the (ante litteram) Beveridgean models provided modest ben-
efits and coverage was limited to either public sector employees and blue 
collars or those most in need.   
A phase of institutional consolidation then followed in the critical period be-
tween World War I and II. Consolidation implied a limited extension of so-
cial protection schemes, by enlarging the basket of protected risks and mod-
erately increasing benefit levels. This process was apparent both in demo-
cratic systems (such as France, the Netherlands, the UK and the Nordic coun-
tries) and in countries which had fallen under authoritarian (Italy, Spain and 
Portugal) or totalitarian (Germany) rule. In a period characterised by eco-
nomic depression and wartime planning, welfare states unified and ‘stand-
ardised’ previous policy experiments which were initiated in the previous 
phase and remedies for all citisens were institutionalised via public policies’ 
social protection provision (Heclo, 1981). 
As it is well known, this phase of moderate expansion was followed by re-
markable welfare state development during the so called “Trente Glo-
rieuses”, roughly 1945-75, which we can consider as the phase of great and 
continuous expansion of the welfare state throughout Europe. As the ILO 
noted in 1949: “There is a movement everywhere towards including addi-
tional classes of the population covering a wider range of contingencies, 
providing benefits more nearly adequate to needs and removing anomalies 
among them, loosening the tie between benefit right and contribution pay-
ment, and, in general, unifying the finance and administration of branches 
hitherto separate” (ILO 1949 document, cited in Briggs, 1961: 223-224). Put 
differently, coverage was expanded to reach either the entire employed pop-
ulation – in Bismarckian systems – or the whole population – in Beveridgean 
countries. Most, if not all, ‘old’2 social risks (sickness, old age, disability, 
unemployment, etc..) were protected in all countries, while benefits became 
                                                 
2 The term is used here in opposition to the concept of “new social risks”, cf. Taylor-Gooby 
(2004) and Armingeon and Bonoli (2006). 
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more generous and schemes proliferated often giving rise to fragmented ar-
chitectures along occupational lines (Bismarckian systems), including ‘tiers’ 
and/or ‘pillars’ characterised by different principles and mechanisms. In fact, 
while Bismarckian countries established non-contributory anti-poverty 
schemes (especially in the field of pensions and health care), systems with a 
Beveridgean imprint introduced supplementary contributory schemes for the 
employed population which were public (tiers) or private (pillars). Public 
(and private) social spending increased greatly (both in GDP and pro capita 
terms), turning into the first item of government expenditure in all European 
countries. In sum, during the Golden Age or expansion phase, welfare ar-
rangements became a fundamental institutional feature of capitalist democ-
racies in Europe, modifying the nature of the State – previously committed 
primarily to regulation, defense and maintenance of social order only – and 
deeply affecting political exchange dynamics in a context of democratic con-
solidation – both on the side of political supply (competition among political 
parties) and political demand (individual voters, to begin with, but even more 
so in terms of competition among interest groups for resource allocation 
aimed at responding to the members’ requests).  
Since the mid-1970s, however, the pre-conditions that had favored such re-
markable expansion of the welfare state in Europe (more or less) rapidly 
faded away. Demographic trends determined ageing populations, economic 
growth decreased markedly, economic development was often punctuated by 
recurrent crises – the two oil shocks of the 1970s, the recessions in the early 
1990s and 2000s until the post-2008 Great Recession –, de-industrialisation 
advanced and, with the transition to a service economy, labor market condi-
tions dramatically shifted towards increased flexibility – either “across the 
board” or “at the margin” – and precariousness. Furthermore, also family 
structures were changing rapidly (Pierson, 2001), giving birth to ‘new social 
demands’ linked to ‘new social risks’ (Taylor Gooby, 2004; Armingeon and 
Bonoli, 2006).  
State finances deteriorated, while international and supranational pressure 
increasingly constrained and oriented national policymakers’ choices in the 
field of social policies (Graziano, 2003). Also favored by the ideological turn 
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towards liberalism and the shift from a predominantly Keynesian macroeco-
nomic framework to neo-liberal recipes, since the early 1990s European 
countries underwent a thorough process of welfare reform, mostly character-
ised by retrenchment interventions (Pierson, 2001) with some attempts to 
“recalibrate” existing welfare arrangements (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003). 
Despite institutional resilience and inertia, almost three decades of welfare 
reforms have substantially modified established welfare architecture in Eu-
rope (Palier, 2010), and this is especially true after the recent wave of reform 
during the Great Recession, following both the global financial shock and 
the ensuing sovereign debt crisis (circa 2009-12). Although retrenchment 
may not be ‘the only game in town’ (van Kersbergen, Vis and Hemerijck, 
2014), the past decades have been decades of reform – primarily under the 
form of ‘retrenchment’ or ‘recalibration’. 
2.2. The Latin American Experience 
When compared to European developments, the emergence of Latin Ameri-
can welfare states came some decades later. While pioneer countries intro-
duced the first social protection programs in the 1910s (Uruguay) and the 
1920s (Chile), most others followed in the 1930s (Brazil 1934, Colombia, 
Peru and Venezuela all in 1936), and in the 1940s (Costa Rica 1941, Argen-
tina and Mexico 1943). In this period, the ruling elites both in democratic 
and authoritarian systems established the first social protection schemes in 
accordance with the Bismarckian principles, with the aim to either attract 
political support or co-opt politically influential groups such as the military, 
civil servants and “strategically located groups of public- and private sector 
employees” (Huber and Stephens 2012, 74). Thus, coverage mostly re-
mained limited and circumscribed to these groups, which have been also la-
belled as ‘insiders’ (Garay, 2016).  
Similarly to Europe, although the welfare effort remained significantly lower 
than in most European countries, the three decades from the 1950s to the 
1970s represented a period of substantial welfare state expansion – especially 
(but not exclusively) in the richest countries of the region. Welfare state ex-
pansion occurred in a phase marked by strong economic development and 
growth, favored by the adoption of the protectionist ISI (Import Substitution 
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Industrialisation) model and state-led industrialisation, relative insulation of 
domestic policies from external pressure, and the strengthening of the work-
ing class and labor (Filgueira, 2005). A sequential and predominantly path-
dependent process of welfare state expansion appeared, with subsequent ex-
tensions of coverage aimed at protecting the different occupational catego-
ries and especially the formally employed population (Huber and Stephens, 
2012), while inclusion of rural and informal workers lagged behind (Haggard 
and Kaufmann, 2008). Most developed Latin American welfare states turned 
into occupationally fragmented institutional architectures, with notable re-
gressive implications and policy profiles primarily attached to the male 
breadwinner principle (Franzoni, 2008).  
The two subsequent phases showed opposite developments. Between the 
1980s and the early 2000s, despite the ‘third wave’ of democratisation in-
volving most Latin American countries (Huntington, 1991), social policy ex-
pansion was significantly constrained and both retrenchment measures and 
processes of privatisation appeared especially in high spending sectors such 
as pensions. This phase was substantially affected by three key dynamics: i) 
recurrent economic and debt crises, ii) the abandonment of the ISI model 
with the shift to more open economies, and iii) increased pressure from in-
ternational institutions such as the World Bank and especially the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). It was a phase characterised by crisis and (ne-
oliberal) reform, similarly to the European context although the determinants 
were different (see next section) and in Latin America the influence of the so 
called ‘Washington consensus’ was particularly relevant in terms of promot-
ing neoliberalism: “The template for Latin America’s engagement with ne-
oliberalism was the Washington Consensus — the name and indication of 
how far neoliberalism was leveraged by the US and the international finan-
cial institutions. The Washington Consensus set out to transform economic 
practices across Latin America via a range of policies from the privatisation 
of public assets to cuts in public expenditure, and it played well at a time of 
conservative and timid democratisation when the ‘excesses’ of the Left were 
blamed for having provoked the violence that engulfed much of the region 
in the 1960s and 1970s.” (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 4).  
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Differently, since the early 2000s a phase of remarkable expansion of welfare 
programs opened in most, if not all, Latin American countries. Notably, this 
phase was also characterised by a shift towards more inclusive social poli-
cies, with the establishment of important non-contributory benefits – pen-
sions, health care programs, family benefits and conditional cash transfers 
(CCT) – directed to protect traditional ‘outsiders’ – informally employed and 
rural workers in Latin America – often in combination with increased invest-
ment in education (Pribble, 2014; Garay, 2016). To be true, Latin America 
has been the first continent to formulate, adopt and implement ‘post-neolib-
eral’ policies on a wide scale: “In Latin America, attempts to articulate a new 
political economy of development began gradually around the turn of the 
millennium as a series of left, or left of centre, governments took office, 
promising an end to the cautious pro-elite era of democratisation and a more 
expansive approach to welfare spending” (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 2).  
In fact, the most striking feature of recent reforms in Latin America is the 
inclusive nature, especially in terms of including ‘outsiders’ which have of-
ten been seen as the least protected due their traditional lack of political and 
social representation. Similar to more recent changes in European countries 
with respect to the insiders-outsiders cleavage (Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2013), 
also in Latin America outsiders have become politically ‘more attractive’. 
Especially in some Latin American countries, following the democratic tran-
sitions mentioned previously, the outsider population became quite consid-
erable (between 40% and 60% of the total population), “and displayed two 
fundamental features: political relevance and policy neglect” (Garay, 2016: 
24). We shall turn more specifically to the determinants of such change, but 
for the moment it suffices to say that in light of such ‘inclusive turn’ we label 
this second wave of reforms as expansionary ones with a particular visible 
‘inclusive’ nature.  
We may conclude this section by pointing at three main inter-regional dif-
ferences: i) welfare state development was delayed in Latin America as com-
pared to Europe; ii) welfare state expansion constituted a much more homo-
geneous process – in terms of achievements, expenditure levels, coverage 
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and benefit generosity3 - in West European countries than in Latin America; 
iii) the current phase of welfare state development in Western Europe is quite 
different from the one experienced by Latin America. Table 1 illustrates sim-
ilarities and differences in the various phases of welfare state development. 
 
Table 1.  
Phases of welfare state development in Europe and Latin America 
 Europe Latin America 
1880s-1920s Emergence - 
1920s-1940s Consolidation  Emergence 
1950s-1970s Expansion Consolidation  
1980s-2000s      Retrenchment 
Retrenchment                       
(activation turn) 
Retrenchment 
2000s-2016                                           Expansion  
(inclusive turn) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on various sources. 
 
3. The ‘What’ and the ‘Why’ of Welfare State Development. A 
cross-regional perspective. 
In reviewing the theoretically informed contributions aimed at explaining 
welfare state change in the two regions, it is preliminarily important to iden-
tify ‘what’ this literature has tried to explain – the explanandum – and which 
factors (explanans or explanantes) have been considered relevant in trigger-
ing certain developments – the ‘why’ question. As already mentioned, there 
are a limited amount of comparative theoretical contributions, and the main 
aim of this paper is to provide an analytical framework which may be useful 
both theoretically (systematizing existing knowledge and contributions in 
terms of causal links) and empirically (providing a point of departure of fur-
ther empirical enquiries). 
                                                 
3 Just to mention the cornerstone of modern welfare state, in 1980 pension coverage varied 
between 20% and 80% of the population in Latin American countries, according to Haggard 
and Kaufmann (2008). Such a remarkable variation was not apparent in Europe after the 
Trente Glorieuses. European welfare states differed more in organizational terms (the ‘how’ 
dimensions) than in welfare effort (‘how much’) (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
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Regarding the explanandum, the literature on both European and Latin 
American countries has focused on understanding and interpreting the i) 
emergence, ii) the expansion, iii) and the reform – via retrenchment or recal-
ibration measures – of welfare state arrangements. However, scholars dif-
fered much in the specific object of their analysis: while some have focused 
on social policy outcomes – such as poverty or inequality –, other have short-
ened the causal chain by pointing their analytical lenses towards policy out-
puts. Furthermore, with respect to policy outputs, several welfare state poli-
cies have often been analyzed in a very sectorial fashion (healthcare, pen-
sions, social assistance, employment, etc.). In the latter case, some have 
aimed to interpret reform content – typically through qualitative analysis –, 
while others have indulged in more quantitative measures of ‘welfare effort’ 
– generally combining coverage, expenditure and benefit levels indicators. 
With this respect, a number of problems have emerged, especially in terms 
of timing and measurement. In terms of timing, several contributions have 
taken a short or medium term approach, i.e. focusing on a ‘wave’ of reforms 
and focusing on the nature of changes with respect to a status quo (for exam-
ple, the reforms of the 1990s, the reforms of the 2000s, etc.). With respect to 
measurement, although coverage, expenditure and/or benefit levels have 
been the most important indicators considered, much more disagreement can 
be seen in terms of labelling the possible policy change occurred in a given 
country or set of countries. Put differently, quite often in analyzing policy 
content researchers have indulged in discretionary zeal and what may have 
been considered as ‘radical’ or ‘paradigmatic’ changes to some, were seen 
as marginal changes by others (see, for example, the debate on the changes 
in Scandinavian welfare states during the ‘90s: Kvist and Greve, 2010). In 
terms of both outputs and outcomes, the ‘modelling business’ in welfare state 
analysis (Abrahamson, 1999; Powell and Barrientos, 2011) has also gained 
quite a prominent role in the last decades, especially after the publication of 
Esping-Andersen’s 1990 contribution. In this article we shall deliberately not 
consider the ‘regime’ literature since our main goal is to focus on welfare 
trajectories and not on welfare variants. 
Turning to the drivers of change, a broad set of explanatory factors has been 
produced by welfare state literature which we will not review at length due 
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to space reasons. For the purpose of this article, it suffices to note that differ-
ent emphasis has been placed on some factors rather than others. For exam-
ple, Gough, in an early attempt to critically review the main explanatory fac-
tors, focuses on “three major schools of non-Marxist thought” which are 
“functionalist theories of welfare state, economic theories of government 
policy, and pluralist theories of democracy” (Gough, 1978: 28). Clearly, the 
theories are not mutually exclusive since several factors may account for a 
specific welfare state development. Flora has been the scholar that has pro-
posed possibly the most encompassing ‘multicausal explanatory framework’ 
mobilizing a wide range of drivers:  three factors are of a socio-economic 
nature (industrialism, capitalism and family/population), three are of a polit-
ical one (mass democracy, nation state, and international system). Beyond 
Flora, and especially in the account of the most recent reforms, also institu-
tional factors such as regime types, state organisation (centralised versus fed-
eral systems), bureaucratic and administrative features, policy settings, etc. 
(Pierson, 2001; Rothstein, Samanni and Teorel, 2012) have been considered. 
In sum, and broadly speaking, explanatory factors can be clustered in three 
main groups: i) socio-economic; ii) political; iii) institutional.  
The socio-economic factors are well known and were mobilised by the “first 
generation” of welfare state scholars (Myles and Quadagno, 2002: 36): eco-
nomic growth and social development, which may be linked to the three 
above mentioned socio-economic factors considered by Flora. The so called 
‘logic of industrialism’ is undisputedly considered as the main driving force 
behind the emergence, consolidation and expansion of European welfare 
states. The most diffused version of the theory is the “weak” version accord-
ing to which “industrialism and its correlates (economic growth, population 
aging) are necessary to account for the common trend line in welfare state 
expansion” (Myles and Quadagno, 2002: 36). Especially during the ‘golden 
age’ of welfare state, it seemed quite clear – and uncontested – that rising 
incomes gave an opportunity to governments to raise growing taxes without 
penalizing workers too much. Furthermore, “rising productivity and chang-
ing labor force practices led to the spread of retirement, a development that 
generated enormous demand for the expansion of public pensions. These 
correlates of a mature industrial order clearly matter, and measures of GDP 
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per capita and percentage of elderly are now standard control variables in all 
empirical models of welfare state spending” (Myles and Quadagno, 2002: 
36). Put differently, “[i]f there is one source of welfare spending that is most 
powerful—a single proximate cause, it is the proportion of old people in the 
population” (Wilensky 1975: 47). Such a ‘logic’ may have been particularly 
convincing in terms of the quantity of welfare state provisions, but not satis-
factory in understanding the quality (or different welfare state policy ‘menus’, 
not only in terms of goals but also in terms of principles, procedures and fund-
ing) available in different European western states. Especially in the compar-
ative analysis of welfare states, the need for more fine grained type of research 
and explanations which went beyond the pure logic of industrialism (or post-
industrialism; Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006) became quite clear.  
Together with socio-economic factors, also political factors gained growing 
scholarly attention – especially with regard to the emergence and consolida-
tion of European welfare states. In the path-breaking neo-marxist accounts 
provided by authors like Offe (1972) the political factors are strongly asso-
ciated to the ‘logic of capitalism’: “The common denominator of the most 
advanced and of the most backward welfare state is the coexistence of pov-
erty and affluence, or in more precise terms, the coexistence of the logic of 
industrial production for profit and the logic of human need” (Offe, 1972: 
480). In this specific reading, “Welfare states are the inevitable product of 
large economic forces beyond the control of policy makers and publics that 
compel a common response.” (Myles and Quadagno, 2002: 37). A more 
‘pure’ political account of welfare state development and specificities is 
linked to the so called Power Resource Theory or Approach which was for-
malised by Korpi (1983) and then picked up by a series of scholars. Accord-
ing to this approach, “because of differences in the ways that socio-economic 
class is related to types of power resources controlled by citisens as well as 
to patterns of life-course risks among individuals differently positioned 
within socio-economic structures, welfare state development is likely to re-
flect class-related distributive conflict and partisan politics” (Korpi, 2006: 
3). Empirically, welfare state differences in terms of coverage, entitlements 
and benefit levels have been explained by the “relative success of left parties, 
particularly Social Democratic parties, aligned with strong trade unions in 
2018/02 
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shaping the democratic class struggle” (Myles and Quadagno, 2002: 38). 
More recently, nuances in the approach have been suggested by focusing on 
innovative traits of party competition in terms of changing electoral constit-
uencies, interaction between party strategies and the institutional setting, and 
different linkages (particularistic vs- programmatic) between parties and vot-
ers (Häusermann, Picot and Geering, 2013: 239).  
Finally, also pure institutional factors have been considered as drivers of wel-
fare state developments: institutional features of government, electoral rules, 
institutional veto points, state organisation, bureaucratic and administrative 
features (particularly relevant if implementation is taken into the picture) as 
well as policy legacies are all explanatory factors that – according to some 
readings – have reduced the autonomous capacity of parties (and interest 
groups) in supporting welfare state expansion. Also, the emerging institutional 
constraints provided by globalisation and – with respect to European countries 
– the membership to the EU have also been scrutinised by scholars (among 
others, Swank, 2005; Graziano, Jacquot and Palier, 2011) interested in the role 
played by exogenous factors in the latest phase of welfare state development, 
i.e. crisis and retrenchment. 
As for Latin American countries, the various contributions have highlighted 
the relevance of different drivers of change in the different phases. In the 
emergence period, the introduction of the first social protection schemes has 
been mostly understood, in the seminal work of Mesa-Lago (1978), as polit-
ical elites’ responses to mobilisation of powerful groups which were key ei-
ther for electoral competition in long-standing democracies – such as Chile, 
Uruguay and, later, Costa Rica – or self-legitimation and consensus seeking 
purposes in authoritarian regimes. Although the first social insurance 
schemes were established independently of political regimes, Haggard and 
Kaufmann (2008) argue that regime type mattered also in the genetic phase, 
since reforms that “went beyond the incremental expansion of occupational 
based social security programs to encompass altogether new groups of peo-
ple, including the countryside” (Haggard and Kaufmann 2008, 111) and were 
adopted in the three democratic regimes mentioned above (Chile, Uruguay, 
Costa Rica).  
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Socio-economic factors based on the so called ‘logic of industrialism’ have 
been proposed in order to account for the two expansionary phases of the 
Latina American welfare state: the first, during the ISI period, and the sec-
ond, more recent phase characterised by ‘the inclusive turn’. Certainly, eco-
nomic development and growth, as well as the commodity boom of the 
2000s, were relevant context factors which allowed the expansion of social 
protection in Latin American countries; nevertheless, economic explanations 
show the same weaknesses raised by European scholars: in a nutshell, due to 
the long causal chain implied by economic interpretations, the ‘logic of in-
dustrialism’ approach is neither able – alone – to explain the emergence of 
different welfare regimes nor to give account of the diverse welfare efforts 
in countries with similar level of economic development. Consequently, even 
in the Latin American experience, economic explanations do not displace 
institutional and political interpretations which are indeed key to capture 
both the magnitude and the content of welfare state development, and change 
in the various phases (Haggard and Kaufmann, 2008; Huber and Stephens, 
2012). In the same vein, regarding the recent expansionary wave of welfare 
state change in Latin America, the important contribution by Garay (2016) 
reveals significant de-alignment between periods of strong economic growth 
and the adoption of inclusive social policy reforms.  
More prominently, socio-economic factors of a different fashion have been 
considered in order to understand social policy developments in the critical 
period characterised by the dismantlement of the ISI model and during the 
recurrent economic and debt crises in Latin America. The combination of 
fiscal constraints and the need to recur to external financial aid primarily by 
the IMF actually made domestic social policymaking increasingly porous to 
the neoliberal principles inscribed in the framework of the so called ‘Wash-
ington consensus’. Despite the shift from authoritarian to democratic regimes 
in the region, in the account of Barrientos (1998) and other scholars (Madrid, 
2003), the ‘neoliberal turn’ prompted retrenchment measures in high spending 
sectors such as pensions, coupled with the imposition/adoption of privatisation 
reforms in the same welfare sectors in accordance with policy paradigms 
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promoted by the main international organisations (read, the ‘three pillar’ pen-
sion model by the World Bank 1994)4. Nevertheless, as showed by Haggard 
and Kaufmann (2008) and similarly to the findings provided by Europeani-
sation scholars with respect to ‘external constraints’, the national transposi-
tion of policy templates developed by international organisations has always 
been filtered - and, thus, substantially re-shaped - by domestic policy legacies 
and ’entrenched interests’. And this remains true even in cases where ‘formal 
conditionality’ clauses were imposed by international organisations5. Fur-
thermore, as we will see below, international pressures have become less rel-
evant – as well as less straightforward – in the recent phase of expansionary 
inclusive reforms (Garay, 2016).  
Political and institutional factors therefore appear particularly decisive in 
understanding the long-term welfare policy trajectory in Latin America. In 
terms of political factors, Both Huber and Stephens (2012) and Haggard and 
Kaufmann (2008) works emphasise the key role played by democratic rule 
in welfare state expansion. This holds particularly true in explaining the ex-
pansionary reforms between 1980 and 2005, since democracy allowed polit-
ical mobilisation of the ‘left’, thus making a difference in the long run with 
regard to social policy outputs and especially outcomes: “democracy in the 
long run makes a difference for” the adoption of redistributive social policies 
and, consequently, for “poverty and inequality” (Huber and Stephens, 2012: 
11). Similarly, Haggard and Kaufmann contend that, by allowing both party 
competition for voters (electoral competition) and group mobilisation (i.e. 
interest group competition) – in a framework characterised by accountability 
                                                 
4 An alternative explanation for the spread of neoliberal recipes in Latin America has empha-
sised “diffusion” processes, also identifying the mechanism conducive to policy diffusion - 
learning from earlier adapters, economic competition and spillover, imitation, coercion (Wey-
land, 2004).  
5 Formal conditionality refers to IMF’s requests of implementing structural reforms as “con-
dition” to receive financial assistance. The same mechanism has operated in financial assis-
tance programs by the so called Troika (European commission, European Central Bank and 
IMF) during the recent sovereign crisis in Europe. 
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procedures – democratic regimes propelled expansionary reforms in the ge-
netic phase, during the ISI period as well as in the phase of ‘inclusive expan-
sion’6.  
Nevertheless, these authors acknowledge that democracy represents a neces-
sary, but not sufficient, condition for welfare state expansion and especially 
the implementation of redistributive progressive social policy reforms able 
to reduce poverty and inequality7. Accordingly, both contributions apply 
multicausal explanatory frameworks to interpret long term welfare state de-
velopments in Latin America. In particular, Huber and Stephens (2012) pro-
pose a modified, and more complex version, of the Power Resource Theory 
in order to take into account the peculiarities of the Latin American context: 
late and dependent economic development until the adoption of the ISI 
model, weakness of democracy, labor organisations and left parties. The so 
called ‘power constellation theory’ proposed by these authors therefore in-
volves three different ‘clusters’ of power: the first regards the balance of na-
tional class power and party political power; the second regards the structure 
of state-society relations; the third concerns transnational structures of 
power. Applying such theoretical framework, they conclude that democracy 
is the most important factor in explaining welfare state expansion from 1980 
to 2005, in part because of “its direct effects, but more importantly because 
it was at the beginning of the causal chain […] made left political mobilisa-
tion possible and left political strength had important effects on inequality 
and poverty” (Huber and Stephens, 2012: 7) via the adoption of redistributive 
social policies.  This was also possible, however, due to the change in the 
transnational structure of power in the early 2000s, also including some ide-
ational turn – away from neoliberalism and the Washington consensus – on 
the side of the main international organisations.  
                                                 
6 The main difference between these two contributions as for the relevance of democratic 
regimes for welfare state expansion regard the genetic phase. In fact, differently from Haggard 
and Kaufmann, Huber and Stephens point at the limited role of political competition and the 
presence of authoritarian or weak democratic regimes which did not allow for mobilization of 
left forces and, consequently, the adoption of genuinely redistributive social policies. 
7 See the argument by Huber and Stephens about the regressive effects of social insurance 
schemes.  
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As for the institutional factors, Haggard and Kaufmann (2008) present a 
complex interpretative framework8 which, within the structure of constraints 
and opportunities provided  by different regime types (democratic vs authori-
tarian and semi-authoritarian systems), economic conditions and social policy 
legacies, stresses the importance of so called ‘critical realignments’ - that are 
discontinuity “in composition of political elite and in the political and legal 
status of labor and peasant organisations and political parties” (Haggard and 
Kaufmann, 2008: 45) – in explaining reform outcomes. Accordingly, with ref-
erence to the critical phase between the 1980s and the mid-2000s, they argue 
that “democracy created a new politics of welfare reform. However, the policy 
outcomes were strongly affected by differences in economic conditions and in 
the distribution and organisation of social-policy interests that had emerged in 
the earlier period” (Haggard and Kaufmann, 2008: 16).  
Furthermore, an important contribution in terms of institutional factors has 
recently been made by Garay (2016) with the aim to capture the drivers 
which have triggered the wave of inclusive social policy reforms since the 
early 2000s. Confronted with the issue of explaining what led policymakers 
in four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile) to 
adopt reforms which favored ‘outsiders’ – the latter often being at the mar-
gins of political competition dynamics due to limited organisational struc-
tures and low levels of political participation (Kurtz, 2004; Jessoula, 2010; 
Jessoula et al. 2010) – she develops a theoretical apparatus by criticizing ex-
isting contributions aimed at interpreting the most recent expansionary 
phase. In particular, building on Rueda’s work on the insider-outsider con-
flict in European welfare states (Rueda, 2007), she contends that the rele-
vance of left power and mobilisation is somewhat overstated. She instead 
presents a parsimonious and effective theoretical framework which points at 
the key role of electoral competition and political exchange dynamics be-
tween governing parties and voters/interest group – respectively the supply 
                                                 
8 It is important to consider that the authors apply such a framework to three distinct world 
regional affected by significant democratization processes since the mid-1980s: Latin Amer-
ica, Asia and Eastern Europe.   
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and the demand side of political exchanges also linked to institutional fea-
tures9. The application of the theoretical framework to the comparative anal-
ysis of recent reforms in the four countries mentioned above brings to the 
conclusion that inclusive social policy measures were adopted when incum-
bents faced with “high levels of electoral competition for the vote of outsid-
ers and/or with large scale social mobilisations by coalitions of social move-
ments on labor unions” (Garay, 2016: 25). Moreover, the two paths, ‘from 
above’ (electoral competition for outsiders’ votes) and ‘from below’ (social 
mobilisation) appear also to be key not only to answer the ‘why’ question 
but also to understand differences in the scope and the organisational struc-
ture (more or less participatory implementation) of adopted non-contributory 
welfare programs. Actually, Argentina and Brazil, where the bottom up ap-
proach prevailed, were also the countries which adopted the more inclusive 
policies.  
4. Discussion  
Our comparative exercise is a first step in a broader and more ambitious re-
search effort of a comparative nature which hopefully will see the light soon. 
This paper is a critical review of the most promising theories which could be 
mobilised for a cross-regional comparison and an attempt to build an analyt-
ical framework which may ‘travel’ across continents. As we have argued in 
the previous sections, although the phases of welfare state development may 
to a certain extent vary, the main explanatory factors can be seen as very 
similar. Clearly, there are regional nuances and peculiarities, but as we try to 
summarise in the following tables we could possibly group the main drivers 
for reform in three categories (socio-economic, political and institutional) 
and see how similarly or differently they have played in the two regions. 
Furthermore, we do not pretend to do justice to all national trajectories – a 
task that not only goes beyond the scope of this paper but also exceeds the 
knowledge of the authors – but we think that the evidence already provided 
by so many valuable scholars from the two continents could constitute the 
                                                 
9 In a similar vein, a recent contribution by Natili (2016) develops and applies a framework 
based on political exchange dynamics in order to explain differences in pro-outsiders reform 
in the field of minimum income scheme in Italy and Spain, Natili (2016). 
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basis for the sketching of a comparative analytical framework, paving the 
way to more theory-informed research. For this purpose, tables 4.1 and 4.2 
try to map out the various factors and their specific relevance in the different 
phases of welfare state development in the two regions. In the European ex-
perience (Tab. 4.1), socio-economic factors seem to have played a very im-
portant role in three phases (emergence, expansion, retrenchment) out of 
four, whereas the political factors have been crucial in the consolidation and 
the expansion phases and scarcely relevant in the retrenchment phase. More-
over, the institutional factors started to play a role only in very recent times, 
and this has specially to do with the ‘exogenous’ pressures linked to global 
and European imperatives and institutions.  
4.1. Welfare State Development: The European Experience Determinants 
 Socio-economic Political Institutional 
Emergence XXX XX  
Consolidation XX XXX  
Expansion XXX XXX X 
Retrenchment XXX X XXX 
XXX=very relevant; XX=relevant; X=poorly relevant; Blank: not relevant at all 
 
The Latin American trajectory is quite intriguing since – unlike the European 
one –it has recently undergone through an expansionary phase which has 
only partially to do with socio-economic and institutional reasons since it is 
primarily rooted in political drivers – i.e. governmental choices aimed at in-
cluding the so called outsiders. More specifically, socio-economic factors 
account only partially for all the phases, whereas the political factors are the 
most important in all the phases with the exception of the retrenchment phase 
when ‘institutional’ (and exogenous) imperatives seemed to prevail. Simi-
larly, to the European experience, the institutional factors have become in-
creasingly relevant in more recent times, especially in the retrenchment 
phase, but have been limited in the expansion phases. To a certain extent, the 
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long term perspective adopted in this article allows us to be partially skepti-
cal towards excessively institutionalist accounts: of course, there are excep-
tions, but the trend which has emerged from the literature analysis is one 
where political factors – together with socio-economic ones, especially in the 
initial phases of welfare state development – play a greater role in explaining 
welfare state development.  
4.2. Welfare State Development: The Latin American Experience Deter-
minants 
 Socio-economic Political Institutional 
Emergence XX XXX  
Consolidation XX XXX  
Retrenchment XX XX XXX 
Expansion XX XXX X 
XXX=very relevant; XX=relevant; X=poorly relevant; Blank: not relevant at all 
In sum, in order to redefine the role of the various factors, we may possibly 
consider the socio-economic ones as ‘contextual’ factors (Gerring, 2012) and 
focus more specifically on the political ones, since they have seemed so im-
portant in our comparative assessment. To be sure, the current literature in 
both continents is apparently going in this direction, but so far there have 
been limited cases for cross-regional comparative research project, guided 
by a common analytical framework. With this critical literature review and 
the sketching of a comparative analytical framework we hope to pave the 
way for future, collective comparative research efforts.   
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